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Abstract 
I use an unbalanced panel data to explore the correlation between aggregate income per 
capita and income inequality. A lot of studies document controversial results using the Gini 
index or other summary measurements of income inequality. I measure income inequality by 
the two dimensions of a point on the Lorenz Curve, where the Lorenz curve has unit slope. It 
is called the fair division point, which involves the fair population share and the fair income 
share. The difference between the fair population share and the fair income share 
approximates the Gini index of an income distribution. 
My analysis shows that a country’s low income population relatively decreases (the fair 
population share drops slightly) as the economy grows; and at the same time, those low 
income households are relatively worse off (the fair income share falls even though the GDP 
per capita increases).  Inversely, as an economy becomes rich, there are more low income 
households (the fair population share increases), but those low income households are better 
off (the fair income share goes up and GDP per capita increases as well). Overall, both the 
Gini index and the difference between the fair population share and the fair income share 
have been increasing during the last half century in the panel of countries. Therefore, income 
inequality increases as an economy is getting richer. 
The analysis presents significant evidence for optimum income inequality regarding both 
the aggregate productivity and the growth rate of GDP, where income inequality is measured 
by either the Gini index or the fair division shares. But no evidence has been found for the 
Kuznets’ hypothesis. Both high and low inequality of income distribution could harm an 
economy as we compare with its potential optimum inequality. Also developed economies 
show different optimum inequality from that in developing economies, and there is the 
growth-worst fair population share that results in the lowest growth in developed economies. 
Measurement of income inequality matters on its economic effects for the subsamples of the 
panel data. 
Keywords: Gini index, Fair population share, Fair income share, Development and 
growth   
JEL Classification: J24, E25, J62, O12. 
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1 Introduction 
I use an unbalanced panel data to explore the correlation between aggregate productivity 
and income inequality. A lot of studies document controversial results using the Gini index or 
other summary measurements of income inequality. I use a two-dimensional metric to 
describe income inequality, where the Lorenz curve has unit slope. It is called fair division 
point, which involves the fair population share and the fair income share, and where the 
Lorenz curve has unit slope. The difference between the fair population share and the fair 
income share approximates the Gini index of an income distribution. 
Economists have done a lot of work to explore how an economy will be affected by 
income inequality, but it turns out to be a complex problem. Ranking income distribution by 
a summary measurement of income inequality was an attempt to address the problem, which 
proved quite unsuccessful, because when two Lorenz curves cross each other with the same 
Gini index (coefficient), we have no way to rank them.  
Partha Dasgupta et al. (1973) prove that strict Schur-concavity
1
 is a sufficient and 
necessary property for a summary measure to rank income distribution. The Gini index is 
Schur-concave, but not strictly Schur-concave, so that the Gini index cannot appropriately 
rank income distribution. Newbery (1970) takes a simple example to demonstrate that the 
Gini ordering over income distributions is not implied by any additive social welfare function 
when the individual utility function is strictly concave and differentiable everywhere. 
Economic development is the primary indicator of social welfare. Hence, we may conclude 
that there is no strict linear relationship between development and the Gini index. Any 
summary measure of income inequality will sacrifice some information about income 
distribution. Currently, there is no strictly S-concave summary index found to measure 
income inequality. 
I define the “fair division point” on a Lorenz curve as the point that presents a particular 
slope to characterize the economy of the Lorenz curve; then, the pair of income share and 
population share at the fair division point describes the overall inequality of income 
distribution. At the fair division point, the income share is called fair income share and the 
population share is called fair population share. Households ordered within the fair 
population share earn relatively lower income than those households ordered above the fair 
population share. The fair income share defines more people as high income earners if the 
                                                          
1
 Strict Schur-concave function ,,,: nn RyxRRf  if x strictly majorizes  y, then, 
    .yfxf   
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slope of fair division point is smaller. For different Lorenz curves with the same Gini index, 
the fair division point will be different, so that it is possible for the fair division point to tell 
us more information about development than the Gini index. I use both Gini index and fair 
division point in this study to describe income inequality so that we should be able to see 
some new information from the fair division point.  
Some literatures (e.g., Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2010) use the income share of the top 
or bottom percentile population to describe income inequality, which is a two dimensional 
metric too; but it is not justified how much the top (or bottom) percentile income share could 
describe the income inequality of the entire income distribution, and it is not satisfactory to 
describe the relationship between aggregate development and the income share of the top (or 
bottom) percentile. 
The Kuznets’ hypothesis suggests that income inequality rises as an agricultural 
economy develops toward an industrial economy and then it decreases as the economy 
becomes rich, which has not been universally supported in empirical studies regardless of the 
measurements of income inequality. Classic growth models show that income inequality is 
persistent and enhances development due to agent heterogeneity and the marginal propensity 
to save increasing with wealth. Neoclassical growth models show that income distribution 
plays an insignificant role on development assuming representative agents and decreasing 
marginal returns in investment. The contemporary view proposes that income inequality 
shows up differently depending on whether the engine of growth goes from physical capital 
to human capital (Galor and Moav, 2004). 
My analysis shows that a country’s low income population relatively goes down (the fair 
population share drops slightly) as the economy develops; and at the same time, those low 
income households are relatively worse off (the fair income share falls).  Inversely, as an 
economy becomes rich, there are more low income households (the fair population share 
increases), but those low income households are better off (the fair income share goes up and 
GDP per capita increases as well). Overall, both the Gini index and the difference between 
the fair population share and the fair income share have been increasing over the last half 
century. Therefore, income inequality increases as an economy is getting richer. 
The analysis presents strong evidence for optimum income inequality regarding both the 
aggregate income per capita and the growth rate of GDP, where income inequality is 
measured by either the Gini index or the fair division shares. But no evidence has been found 
for Kuznets’ hypothesis. Thus, both high and low inequality of income distribution could 
harm an economy as we compare with its potential optimum inequality.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is for literature review, section 3 explains 
functional forms of the economic effects of income inequality, section 4 describes the data, 
section 5 is for econometric issues, section 6 discusses the development effects of income 
inequality, section 7 is for the growth effects of inequality and section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
There are two opposite empirical results about the trend of income inequality within an 
economy and over the world, which correspondingly represent two approaches about the 
economic effects of income inequality. The first one is the neoclassical approach which 
applies representative agents and proposes that income inequality within an economy falls in 
the process of development so that there would be absolute convergence in steady state 
equilibrium. 
Becker and Tomes (1986) show that regression to the mean in earnings in rich countries 
appears to be fast, and almost all the advantages and disadvantages of ancestors disappear in 
three generations. Becker et al. (2005) find stark reduction in world inequality after 
incorporating gains in longevity. Sala-I-Martin (2006): Eight indices of income inequality 
show reductions in global inequality during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) find that inequality of world distribution of income 
worsened from the beginning of the 19th century to World War II and after that seems to 
have stabilized or to have grown more slowly. In the early 19th century most inequality was 
due to differences within countries; later, it was due to differences between countries. 
Inequality in longevity, also increased during the 19th century, but then was reversed in the 
second half of the 20th century, perhaps mitigating the failure of income inequality to 
improve in the last decades. 
Actually, the world income inequality is determined by both the income inequality 
within each economy and the income inequality across economies, and the population 
weights of each country. Even though both of the two inequalities have been increased, but 
the weighted world inequality can be decreased. World income inequality is not a very 
meaningful concept no matter how it has been changing since it is about the income 
distribution of global economy; the world economy is not a really complete economy, 
because many countries are pretty much independent and have distinct economic systems. 
The second one is called new neoclassical approach because it discards the assumption 
of representative agents and shows persistent income inequality with negative effects on 
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development, which is contrast with the classical and neoclassical growth theory that income 
inequality is beneficial or neutral for development. Recent empirical studies present that both 
within (sectors, economies) and across (sectors, economies) wage inequalities have been 
increasing in developed economies in the last decades, and it is due to the advances of so-
called skill-biased technology (Krusell et al., 2000; Acemoglu, 2002) and the indivisibility in 
investment of human capital (Galor and Joseph, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002). 
Krusell et al. (2000) find that the rise in the college premium could be largely attributed 
to an increase in the rate of (capital-embodied) skill-biased technical progress. Heathcote, et 
al. (2004, 2009) document that wage inequality in the USA significantly rises from 1960s to 
1990s which includes both permanent and persistent components, and transitory shocks as 
well; Acemoglu (2002) finds that technological progress has skill-biased impacts on wage 
inequality in the past sixty years in the US because the rapid increase of skilled labor has 
induced the development of skill-complementary technologies. Rios-Rull, et al. (2002) find 
that the basic facts about economic inequality in the United States did not change (improve) 
much during the 1990s, earnings, income and wealth had been unequally distributed just as 
they were at the beginning of the decade. Saez (2005) finds that the increase in annual top 
income shares in North America since 1970s is due to a surge in top wages and salaries, the 
United States reduced marginal tax rates for high income earners in the last 40 years but 
Canada didn’t, and the mobility in top wage earners has been very stable in Canada, so that 
he conjectures a permanent income concentration in the last decades. Krueger et al. (2007) 
find that wage and skill premium inequalities have substantially increased over last three 
decades in most of the nine countries (U.S., Canada, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Russia and Mexico).  
Finally, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find nonlinearity correlation between growth and 
income inequality, which resolves the previous confusion of opposite evidences. This paper 
further finds that the correlation between development (growth) and income inequality is 
inverted U- shape, and income inequality shows different impacts in developed economies 
from developing economies.  
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3 Functional Forms for the Effects of Inequality 
3.1 Fair Division of Income Distribution and Growth 
Since two different income distributions may have the same Gini index when they 
intersect, then, the Gini index cannot rank income distribution for these intersection cases. 
Let p  denote cumulative population percentage (share) in an economy that people are 
ordered by the amount of income they have earned, w  denote cumulative wealth percentage 
(share) holding by the people within the population share of p in the economy. Figure 3.1 
below shows that triangle Lorenz curves M and L intersect and have the same Gini index, but 
each Lorenz curve denotes a different income distribution and corresponds to distinct 
economic development levels, say, the two economies may have very different aggregate 
productivities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refer to Figure 3.2 below; consider an income distribution expressed by a differentiable 
and strictly increasing Lorenz curve: 
            1.1.31,0,11,00,0),(:,)( '  xLLpLpLwwppL  
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ll  
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Figure 3.1.1 Lorenz Curves with Equal Gini Index 
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The slope s is determined by the characteristics of an economy at equilibrium, say, 
agents’ preferences, markets’ properties and aggregate production technology. The division 
point F is defined such that all people in the economy have the same growth rate of income; F 
is called balanced division point of income distribution, the corresponding growth of 
income is called balanced growth. Later (3.1.8) gives the explanation.  
When 1s , the marginal increase of income share is larger than the marginal increase of 
population share for all population shares larger than lp , households located above lp  can be 
called high income households; and the marginal increase of income share is less than the 
marginal increase of population share for all population shares less than lp  , households 
located within lp  
can be called low income households; so that F  ll wp ,  separates 
households in the economy into two parts on Lorenz curve. To ease exposition and 
computation, we assume the slope s to be unit in this study. 
Let’s call point F  ll wp ,  Fair Division Point of Lorenz curve ),( wpL  when s = 1, lp  is 
called the fair (division of ) population share and lw is called the fair (division of) income 
share.  
For a given point F  ll wp , , we ignore the redistribution within high income or low 
income groups, so that we assume the corresponding Lorenz curve is uniquely determined by 
the fair division point, for instance, when Lorenz curve is a triangle with the fair division 
point as one of its vertex. For given fair division point F  ll wp , , any differences on Lorenz 
curve will be resource reallocation within the group of either low or high income households. 
We will only explore the economic effects of income redistribution between low income and 
high income groups, not within each group.  
w
p
l
p
l
w
 F
Figure 3.1.2 Lorenz curve and Fair Division Point 
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Actually, we can see that the Gini index can be approximated by the difference of fair 
division shares by approaching a Lorenz curve with a triangle. Figure 6.1.1b and Figure 
6.1.4b Section 7 show that the Gini index and the difference of fair division shares 
empirically match very well by the estimation of fixed effects. For different Lorenz curves 
with the same Gini index, fair division point will be different, so that it is possible for fair 
division point to tell more information about development than Gini index.  Following 
equation (3.1.3) and Figure 3.3 show this proposition. 
 
 3.1.3
22IndexGini
ll
AOBFOB
wp
OASS

 
 
 
Now, we discuss the condition of balanced growth that all people in the economy enjoy 
the same growth rate of income.  
There are two groups of population regarding to income per capita in the economy. Low 
income households have a population share and income share of  ll wp , , and high income 
households have the population share and income share of    hh wp , . Let rg  denote the 
growth rate when the economy moves from income distribution  ll wp ,  to  
 llll wwpp  , , Wi  is the income per capita of type i household, i=l, h, and the change 
of income per capita for the people of group i  is iW , and ig  is the growth rate of income 
for the type (group) i population, then: 
B 
O                         A 
0
45  
w
p
l
p
l
w
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Figure 3.1.3 Gini Index and Fair Division Shares 
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Employing (3.1.4), we can find the interaction of income growth between the two groups 
of people, where the letter a denotes the ratio of growth rates of income for the two types of 
people, 0
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Let wg  be the growth rate of income share at wl for the low income group, and pg  the 
growth rate of population share at pl for the low income group:  
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 For the balanced growth, we have the following results: 
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We define the unique point (pl, c/pl) of satisfying (3.1.8) on the Lorenz curve as the 
balanced division point of income distribution in the sense that all people have the same 
growth rate of income, constant c is determined by the initial condition. The slope s of the 
Lorenz curve at the balanced division point is determined by the characteristics of the 
economy, the constant c. The value of s is around unit. This is why we have the definition of 
(3.1.2) for the fair division point, which is an approximation of the balanced division point. 
Finally, we explore the correlation between growth and fair division of income 
distribution. It is not guaranteed that the growth of income would be equal between people 
grouped by the fair division point, then, we have following unbalanced growth.  Employing 
(3.1.5) and ,hl gg  we have:  
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Above equation gives the following results about the correlation between aggregate 
growth and the fair income division (pl, wl):  
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Conclusion:  
The correlation between aggregate growth and fair division of income distribution is 
nonlinear, and can be affected by the fair division point (pl, wl), growth of income for the two 
groups (gl, gh), and the growth of fair division shares (gp, gw). 
The growth effects of fair division point of income distribution can be both positive and 
negative.  
Especially the negative correlation between growth and the fair income share necessarily 
rely on either a large population share of high income group ph>gppl ,  a large growth of 
income for high income group (gh>0) or a decrease of the fair population share (gp<0). Or 
say, a lower aggregate growth happens if the fair income share increases and the fair 
population share decreases.  
The negative correlation between growth and the fair population share can be satisfied 
with a positive growth of fair income share and faster income growth of high income group, 
agw+(1-a)wh(1+gw)>0. Or say, even though the fair income share increases (gw>0), if the 
growth of income for low income group is less than that of high income group (a<1), then, an 
increase of fair population share will result in a lower overall growth.  
In the next section, we discuss the estimation of the economic (growth) effects of income 
inequality. Typically, we would like to use the quadratic functional form for the estimation. 
 
3.2 Functional Form of the Economic Effects of the Gini Index 
Income inequality is a median situation of income distribution; the two extremities are 
perfectly equal distribution and perfectly unequal distribution. The two extremities won’t be a 
stable equilibrium of distribution due to the heterogeneity of agents in initial endowments, 
skills and preferences, etc., thus, we expect that an efficient market would develop an optimal 
income inequality over time so that all heterogeneous members are rewarded by their 
characteristic endowments, which especially include their physical and human capitals. 
When an income inequality stays at competitive equilibrium, we would believe all agents 
are well off and social welfare stays at optimal state; otherwise, redistribution of resources 
between group-members will automatically start until social welfare is improved; for 
instance, it can be completed by a growth of GDP per capita. Put it in another way, efficient 
reallocations of resource will lead to growth and raise social welfare. During a growth, the 
reallocation improves social welfare in the aggregate level; during a recession, resources are 
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reallocating between group members and some members are losing resources that were 
inefficiently allocated. 
We will choose polynomial functional forms for either the fair division point or the Gini 
index, because it is always easy and possible to find a polynomial expression of independent 
variables to express any local and global fluctuations of a dependent variable. Another 
advantage of polynomial function is that it is easy to calculate the fair division point on the 
Matlab. 
Denote the economic effects of income inequality as  ll wpf ,  for the fair division point, 
and )(gf for the Gini index,  lwgf , for the joint effects of the fair income share and the 
Gini index, and  lpgf ,  for the joint effects of the fair population share and the Gini index, 
respectively.  The economic effects f(...) of an inequality can be either on growth or 
development.  
Due to the heterogeneity in initial endowments of wealth and innate characteristics, 
social welfare would be optimal when income distribution presents a median inequality that 
makes all agents well off up to their individual productivity and preference. Assume there is 
an optimal Gini index g , then, a transitory Gini index g that deviates from g will lead to 
social welfare loss, and it is also assumed that a larger or a smaller non-optimal Gini index 
would have the same social welfare loss; thus, we write the economic effects of income 
inequality by Gini coefficient as follows: 
     2.32 ggcgf   
Where parameters c and  are positive constants, and   is the coefficient of marginal 
effects of the Gini index that deviates from the optimal Gini g . Function (3.2) means that 
any Gini index other than the optimum would lead to welfare loss and a redistribution of 
income toward the optimal Gini g  improves the economic effects  gf . 
Any social welfare index can be the dependent variable of function (3.2). Since both 
GDP per capita and growth rate of GDP per capita can be an indicator of social welfare, in 
the following sections of econometric analysis we will use the two variables as dependent 
variable individually to explore growth and development effects of income inequality. 
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3.3 Functional Form of the Economic Effects of the Fair Division Point 
Assume an optimal fair division point denoted by   ll wpF ,  on the Lorenz curve, a 
transitory fair division point is  ll wpF , . The distance between the two points would be a 
measure of social welfare deviation (inefficiency) due to non-optimal income inequality. A 
reallocation of resources that reduces the distance between the two points should be efficient 
and lead to growth so that social welfare is improved. Similar to function (3.2), we also 
assume that both a larger and smaller value of either fair division shares have the similar 
welfare loss, then, we have following (3.3.1): 
                        
 1.3.3)()(),( 22
2
1

 llllll wwppcwpf   
Where,    ,2,1,0,0  ic i 1  is the coefficient of marginal welfare effect of 
population share that deviates from the optimal population share, 2  is the coefficient of 
marginal welfare effect of income share that deviates from the optimal income share. 
Function (3.3.1) gives a unique optimal fair division point. 
We expect that regression of growth by the function (3.3.1) should present significance 
and the corresponding signs for each item.  
It is possible that the Gini index and one of the fair division shares could jointly describe 
inequality better than any one of them, so that we would like to consider a hybrid metric as 
well. Assume there is an optimal income inequality expressed by the fair income share and 
the Gini index noted by   lwg , , similar to functional form (3.3.1), we have the functional 
form of the hybrid effects of the fair income share and the Gini index as follows: 
       
       3.3.3:,
2.3.3:,
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1




ggppcpgf
ggwwcwgf
lll
lll


 
Where,  ,2,1,0,0  ic i  and 1  is the coefficient of marginal welfare effect of 
income share that deviates from optimal income (or population) share, 2  is the coefficient 
of marginal welfare effect of the Gini index that deviates from the optimal Gini index. We 
expect that (3.3.2) ~ (3.3.3) should be able to tell more information than (3.2.1) ~ (3.3.1) 
because it has one more dimension than (3.2.1) and include the effects of within and between 
redistribution among the low and high income household groups. 
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4. The Data 
4.1 Data Description 
We only consider a reduced form of the economic effects of income inequality, so that 
we will use variables including the Gini index, the fair division point of Lorenz curve, GDP 
per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita and population. 
We use the unbalanced panel data “WIID2C”of income distribution from World Institute 
for Development Economic Research at United Nations University. The panel is unbalanced 
and ranks quality of all observations; high quality data satisfy following criteria: the 
underlying concepts of income or consumption are known, the quality of income concept and 
the survey can be judged as sufficient. The data was collected or adjusted by household. I 
choose 547 observations of 52 countries from 1956 to 2006 in the data, in which 390 
observations are ranked as high quality,  157 observations are ranked as low quality because 
the income concepts or survey quality are not verified. And there are time gaps in the data of 
some countries. 
The definition of income in the data is disposable income or monetary income per 
household and the data collection samples over entire population in each country. All those 
observations of consumption are dropped, because distribution of consumption gives very 
different results of inequality from income, so that the data of income inequality are 
calculated only by disposable income or monetary income.  
The real GDP per capita and its growth rate are adopted from Penn World Table 6.3, 
which have been converted by PPP in 2005 constant price using chain method, denoted by 
rgdpch in the data. The growth rate is the growth rate of Real GDP Chain per capita 
(RGDPCH). Population is also adopted from PWT6.3.  
Considering the economic effects of labor supply within a country, we assume the base 
population size of each country as 1 so that the population index for each observation 
represents the differences of labor supply within a country; I divide each observation of 
population by the biggest one of all observations in each country so that it becomes a 
population index, which is denoted by popw in the data, it approximately shows the trend of 
labor supply within a country over the period of observations. This population index controls 
for the effects of labor supply on the dependent variable within a country. We divided each 
observation of GDP by the maximum of all observations in each country to obtain gdpw, 
which assumes no difference of GDP at optimal state between countries. Considering the 
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effects of population size across countries, I create another population index, denoted by 
popb in the data, which is the observation of population divided by the biggest one in the 
entire panel data, which is 2004 USA population. I also create between-GDP per capita, 
denoted by gdpb, which is the observation of GDP per capita divided by the biggest one in 
the entire panel which is 2000 Luxembourg GDP per capita. 
To obtain fair division point (pl, wl) of each observation of income distribution, I 
approximate Lorenz curve for each observation by 4
th
 degree polynomial for the data of 
quintiles and 6 degree polynomial for the data of percentiles including two endpoints of (0, 0) 
and (1, 1), which is completed in excel; then the fair division points are calculated by the first 
derivative of the polynomial approximation which can be completed on MatLab. There is an 
example of calculating the fair division point (Figure 4.1) in the Appendix. 
The panel data of income distribution were collected by many different public or private 
agents and verified by the project of “WIID2C”.  Table 4.1.1 below shows the data summary. 
 
Table 4.1.1 Variable Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pl 547 0.643 0.067 0.530 0.820 
wl 547 0.379 0.040 0.288 0.691 
g 547 0.369 0.107 0.196 0.64 
gdpb 547 0.253 0.149 0.0199 1 
gdpw 547 0.773 0.1999 0.090 1 
popw 547 0.919 0.093 0.469 1 
popb 547 0.169 0.217 0.0012 1 
growth 547 0.030 0.036 -0.141 0.146 
 
Table 4.1.2 in Appendix shows bilateral correlation between variables.  We can find that 
there is very strong correlation between the Gini index and the fair division shares (0.898 
with the fair population share, 0.572 with the fair income share), and strong correlation 
(0.5327) between GDPb and fair population share, which is larger than the correlation 
(0.4045) between GDPb and the Gini; GDPw and Popw are also strongly correlated (0.636). 
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4.2 The Data of Income Inequality 
The Figures 4.2.1 below shows the observations of the fair division point against the 
Gini index. It is very clear that higher Gini index corresponds to a higher fair division of 
population share and lower division of income share; or say, more households become even 
lower income earners when the Gini index becomes larger.  
Figure 4.2.2b below shows the observations of the fair division shares against GDPb, 
where Pl and Wl denote the fair population share and the fair income share, respectively. It 
seems that the fair income share is stationary in the interval of [0.3, 0.5] and the fair 
population share decreases as the sample countries become richer.  
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Regression results on Table 4.2.1 and Table 4.2.2 in the Appendix show that the fair 
division point can explain more variations of the Gini index than the Gini index does on the 
fair division point, thus, we would expect that the fair division point would be able to tell 
more information about the economic effects of income inequality than the Gini index does.   
The 3D graph of Figures 4.2.3 below shows the fixed effect regression the Gini index on 
the fair division shares, which is the Table 4.2.1 in Appendix. Figure 4.2.3 shows that there is 
strong positive linear relationship between the Gini index and the fair population share, and 
strong non-linear relationship between the Gini index and the fair income share. 
 
 
Table 4.2.3 in the Appendix shows that the fair population share is significantly 
correlated to the fair income share within a country in the data; the regression presents small 
within and between R
2
, and very little overall R
2
. The regressions present some correlations, 
FE corr(u_i, Xb), between the error term and explanatory terms, thus there are some kind of 
endogeneity problem on the regression; possibly there are other omitted factors to determine 
the fair division shares even though the two factors were significantly correlated.  
Figure 4.2.4b shows the observations of the Gini index and growth rate against GDPb. 
Using GDPb, Figure 4.2.2b and Figure 4.2.4b show that both the Gini index and the fair 
population share seem to fall slightly at the early stages of development, but stopped falling 
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further once development has reached some level and they rise slowly in developed 
economies; fair income share does not present very clear trend respect to development. 
Growth rate has much larger variance in developing countries than developed countries. 
 
 
 
Finally Figure 4.2.5 below shows the observations of fair division shares. 
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5. Econometric Analysis 
5.1 Functional Forms 
We are going to employ following three models for econometric analysis on the 
panel data: 
 
 
 
   4.5,0)(,,0~
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


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
 
Where, itX  is a measure of income inequality, the quadratic form of itX  will take 
the functional forms, (3.2) ~ (3.3.3), in section 3. We assume the unobserved error term 
over time and countries of (5.1) ~ (5.2) satisfy the condition of IID and no serially 
correlation. 
For the models (5.1) ~ (5.2), we know pooled OLS is biased due to unobserved 
heterogeneity
2
, thus, we will apply either fixed effect or random effect regressions which 
depend on the correlation between explanatory variables and country specific error term. 
If there is no within heterogeneity, we apply fixed effects model; if there is within 
heterogeneity, we employ the Hausman test to see if the random effect model is 
consistent.  
Equation (5.1) is used to verify Kuznets hypothesis that income inequality would 
show an inverted U-shape in the process of development. If this hypothesis exists in the 
data, then we should be able to get significant estimation for the coefficients and a 
negative sign for the estimation of quadratic item. If we do not find significant quadratic 
effects of inverted U-shape, we will also explore other polynomial forms of GDP per 
capita that show significant estimations. 
Model (5.2) explores the growth effects of income inequality and the existence of 
optimal income inequality for growth. It applies to fixed and random effects regressions. 
When there is no endogeneity problem, say the correlation between covariates and 
panel-level unobserved effects is trivial, we will employ the Hausman test to choose if 
random effect regression presents the same consistent but more efficient estimation. 
                                                          
2
 Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) find strong evidence of sizeable ARCH effects as well as evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the variances. 
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Equation (5.3) is a linear dynamic panel model. It explores the development effects 
of income inequality and it also shows the existence of an optimal income inequality on 
development from the data. This dynamic model is originated by the idea that 
development effects of income inequality works as a shock to transitory GDP per capita. 
Actually, (5.2) and (5.3) use similar covariates to explain two different measures of the 
economic effects of income inequality, (5.3) measures the level effects of GDP, (5.2) 
measures the growth of level effects GDP. 
The model (5.3) includes one lag of the dependent variable as covariate and 
contains unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or random. The lagged dependent variable 
is correlated to itu , the unobserved panel-level effect which makes OLS estimator 
inconsistent. We employ the consistent and efficient GMM estimator created by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which also deals with panels with short time periods and 
large number of panels. The unbalanced panel data I use here give 278 observations of 
32 countries for the dynamic panel model, in which the minimum observation is 1 and 
maximum observation is 40. At time T, the valid instrument set to apply GMM in model 
(5.3) includes all earlier lags:  
 212 22121221 ,,,,,,,,,,,,  iTiiTiiTiTiii XXXXPopPopGDPGDPGDP   
Where, we assume population and income inequality measure are predetermined; 
and the moment condition is 
  TttjGDPuE jitit ,,3,1,,2,0     
Let W denote the matrix of instruments, then, we can perform generalized least 
squares (GLS) on following estimator: 
,_ '4
'
3
2'
2
'
11
''
ttttttt uWXWXWIndexPopWGDPWGDPW   
 
Which gives us the preliminary one-step consistent estimation; and using the first 
step estimated error, we perform the second-step GLS to get the consistent and efficient 
estimation. 
For the causality interpretation between development and income inequality in the 
models (5.1) ~ (5.3), if we assume that the income inequality is exogenous due to  
agents’ heterogeneity in innate endowments and initial resource endowments, then, 
based on the assumption (5.4), then, the significant estimations in (5.1) ~ (5.3) tell the 
causality effects of income inequality on growth and development. Of course, this is 
only an assumed causality interpretation. We do not justify the causality interpretation in 
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this exercise. We would prefer to interpret the estimation as a correlation of the reduce 
forms.  
In the following Section 7, we will see that the growth model (5.2) presents no 
endogeneity since the fixed effect regression shows very trivial correlation between the 
error term and covariates. 
 
5.2 Assumptions about Population and GDP per capita Between 
Countries 
Assumptions about the differences of population size and development need to be 
specified for the above models. Since we are not sure if population size and its growth 
could affect income inequality and economic growth, we would like to explore the 
economic effect of income inequality in two cases: one is that the base population size 
differs across countries, the other one is that the base population sizes are the same 
across countries. 
If we assume that the bases of population size and GDP are the same (a very strong 
assumption!) across countries, it means the base population and base GDP are 
standardized to unit in each country and the only difference of population (GDP) 
between countries is the growth rate of population (GDP). We complete this by dividing 
each observation of population (GDP) with the maximum population (GDP) over time 
of the entire observations within each country. We use popw to denote the variable of 
population index and gdpw for GDP for this assumption. The assumption makes sense in 
the long run when the welfare effects of income inequality are not dominated by the size 
of population but by their human capital. This assumption means that any two countries 
with different population sizes but possessing the same technology would present the 
same welfare effects of income inequality in the long run. 
If we assume the base population and base development are different across 
countries, it means that population and GDP per capita are standardized in the panel 
level by dividing each observation by the maximum of entire panel data, respectively; 
and we use popb and gdpb as the two variables of population and development index, 
respectively. In this case, all countries can be ordered by either population size or per 
capita GDP. This assumption can be more practical since both physical and human 
capital are very different across countries in the panel data. 
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None of the two assumptions is a perfect approximation of real economy; we take 
each of the two assumptions for each issue to see how outcome will vary by the 
assumptions. Since the assumption of same base population is very strong, later we will 
mainly report the work using the assumption of different base population and 
development (popb and gdpb) in the contexture, and the corresponding figures and 
tables of using popw and gdpw are not reported here to reduce the volume of the paper 
but they are available upon request.  
 
5.3 The Choices of Regression Method 
We will apply robust OLS, fixed effects and random effects regressions in the study. 
Robust OLS assumes the error term has zero mean which can be a strong assumption for 
panel data; so if robust OLS has very different results from fixed effect regression, we will 
choose fixed effects regression as our tool. We use the Hausman test to choose between fixed 
effect model and random effect model; if the Hausman test gives a probability larger than 
0.05 with positive chi2 value, then, we will choose the consistent and efficient random effect 
regression as our tool, otherwise, we will report both random and fixed effect regressions.  
Distinct results between OLS and fixed effect model come from their different 
assumptions about the error term. It is a strong assumption on the panel data for OLS model 
to assume independent and identical distribution of the error term because each country is 
subject to different natural endowments and economic institutions; and fixed effect model 
controls for unobserved fixed heterogeneity in the error term. Thus we take the fixed effect 
model as our basic regression tool.  
 
6.  Development and Income Inequality 
Section 6.1 explores if Kuznets hypothesis would fit in the data by both the Gini index 
and the fair division point, which is the model (5.1). Section 6.2 discusses the development 
effects of income inequality using model (5.3). 
 
6.1 Test the Kuznets’ Hypothesis 
Kuznets’ hypothesis proposes that income inequality increases in GDP per capita for 
poor countries and then decreases in GDP per capita for rich countries. It is an inverted U-
shape between income inequality and development. Employing functional form (5.1), we do 
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not see any significant estimation to support the hypothesis, but either the linear form or the 
third degree of polynomial form for GDP per capita can give us different and significant 
estimations. We apply the Gini index and the fair division shares individually to following 
analysis.           
 
6.1.1 Regression of the Gini Index on GDP per Capita 
We run regressions of gdpb on the Gini index with explanatory popb, and choose 
polynomial form of gdpb up to the degree of significance. Table 6.1.1b in the Appendix 
reports the result. The robust OLS regression presents significance with third degree of 
polynomial, fixed effect regression presents significance with only the linear form and 
random effect regression does not show any significance at all with any degree of 
polynomials. The robust OLS regression shows very significant development effects on the 
Gini index, but the estimation is very different from fixed effect model. Random effects 
models do not present any significant development effects on the Gini index, but population 
size shows significant and positive effects on the Gini index.  
The fixed effect linear model gives the following results: 
 There is significant and positive linear relationship between the Gini index and development 
over time and across countries; 
 Population size (popb) plays positive significance on the Gini index. There is very significant 
and positive constant effect for the Gini index, which is at least 0.335; 
 The regression shows very little within and between R2 with explanatory popb and gdpb. 
But with the explanatory variables gdpw and popw, robust OLS, fixed effect and random 
effect models all present more significant and positive correlation between the Gini index and 
development, popw is not significant. Figure 6.1.1b below shows the fixed effect estimation 
of the Gini index by explanatory gdpb and popb. 
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Conclusion: Fixed effect model shows development has significant and positive 
constant effects, and significant and positive effects on the Gini index. Population size (gdpb) 
plays positive significance on the Gini index between countries in both fixed and random 
effect models, but population growth (popw) is insignificant over time within a country. 
Hence, we find no evidence for the Kuznets hypothesis by the measure of Gini index. 
 
6.1.2 Regression of the Fair Population Share on GDP per Capita 
Using the third degree polynomial form for GDP per capita, we run the robust OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects regressions; Table 6.1.2b~w in the Appendix present the 
results for the two assumptions about the base of population and GDP indices. Table 6.1.2b 
shows the following results: 
 The fair population share falls in poor countries as they grow but rises dramatically later in 
rich countries. Population size (popb) presents positive significance between countries. There 
is very significant constant effects on fair population share, which is at least 0.651; 
 The largest within R2 is in the fixed effects model, which is 0.1168; the largest between R2  is 
in the random effect model, which is 0.0931. 
Let lpfitfeb _  
denote the fitted fair population share by fixed effect regression and 
explanatory popb and gdpb. Figure 6.1.2b below graphs the estimations, graphs for random 
effects and regressions with gdpw and popw can be found as Figure 6.1.2w in the Appendix. 
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Conclusion: There are very significant and positive constant effects on fair population 
share as an economy grows; the fair population share decreases as a country gets rid of 
poverty and then it increases as it becomes rich. Population size contributes significant and 
positive effects on the fair population share between countries in both fixed and random 
effect models; but population growth plays insignificance within a country.  
A country’s low income population relatively decreases (the fair population share drops 
slightly) as the economy grows; inversely, as an economy becomes rich, there are more low 
income households (the fair population share increases).  
 
6.1.3 Regression of the Fair Income Share on GDP per Capita 
Table 6.1.3b in the Appendix gives the following results for the regression of fair income 
share on GDP per capita: 
 The fair income share falls in poor countries as they grow and rises dramatically later in 
developed countries as they become richer; 
 Population size makes no significance on the fair income share; There is very significant 
constant income effects, which is at least 0.404; 
 The within R2 is 4.9% and between R2 is 16.33% in the fixed effect regression, and the R2 in 
random effect regression are pretty small. 
Let lWfitfeb _  be the fitted fair income share in random effect model with explanatory 
gdpb and popb. Figure 6.1.3b below graphs the fixed effect estimation with explanatory popb 
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and gdpb. Figure 6.1.3w in the Appendix graphs the fixed effect estimation with explanatory 
popw and gdpw, and the graphs for random and robust OLS results are Figure 6.1.3w in the 
Appendix too. Table 6.1.3w in the Appendix shows that the fair income share decreases in 
the early stages of development in an economy and keeps stable in the middle stages and then 
turns down slightly in developed stages in both fixed effect and random effect models; there 
is significant constant effects at least 0.403 and popw is significant.  
Conclusion: There are significant and positive constant fair income share as an economy 
grows; the fair income share decreases in poor countries and it increases later in rich 
countries in the process of development. Population size between countries does not 
contribute any significant effects on the fair income share in both fixed and random effect 
models, but population growth does show significant and positive effects on fair income 
share. Thus, fair income share does not support Kuznets hypothesis too. 
As an economy grows, low income households are relatively worse off (the fair income 
share falls even though the GDP per capita increases); Inversely, as an economy becomes 
rich, those low income households are better off (the fair income share goes up and GDP per 
capita increases as well).  
 
 
 
6.1.4 Regression of the Difference of Fair Division Shares on GDP per 
Capita 
 
The difference between the fair population share and the fair income share is another 
measure of income inequality. This difference tells if the low income population is better off 
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in the sense of comparing their income share with their population share as an economy 
becomes richer. The results are reported in Table 6.1.4b in the Appendix. 
Figure 6.1.4b below graphs the results of fixed effect regression on gdpb and popb. The 
difference goes up as an economy grows in fixed effect model, but it does not show any 
significant increase in random effect model, robust OLS shows very different estimations that 
the difference drops a lot in developing countries and rises slightly in developed economies, 
and there is very significant constant effect over time and across countries which is at least 
0.247. 
Comparing Figure 6.1.4b with Figure 6.1.1b, we can find the two graphs look like very 
similar. This is the evidence in section 2.2 that we suggest to interpret the Gini index as the 
difference of the fair division shares. The difference of fair division shares has been 
increasing over time and across countries in most of the economic history in this panel data, 
and the robust OLS, fixed effect and random effect model all give similar results; the 
significant constant effect is at least 0.261. Thus, even though above section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 
tell that both the fair population share and the fair income share fall first and rise later as an 
economy becomes richer, but the fair population share goes up faster than fair income share, 
thus, income inequality does not improve over time and across countries in the sense of the 
difference of the fair division shares, which agrees with the performance of the Gini index in 
fixed effect models in section 6.1.1.  
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Conclusion: Both the fair population share and the fair income share fall slightly in poor 
countries, but they rise dramatically in rich countries, and the difference between the two 
dimensions has been rising! The Gini index also falls a little bit in poor countries and has 
been rising dramatically over most of the process of development.  
A country’s low income population relatively decreases (the fair population share drops 
slightly) as the economy grows; and at the same time, those low income households are 
relatively worse off (the fair income share falls even though the GDP per capita 
increases).  Inversely, as an economy becomes rich, there are more low income households 
(the fair population share increases), but those low income households are better off (the fair 
income share goes up and GDP per capita increases as well).  
Population size and its growth play some roles in the evolution of income inequality. 
Table 6.1 below summarizes all the estimations of population effects in above regressions. 
Population size presents positive significance on the fair population share and the Gini index, 
but no significant effects on the fair income share; population growth shows positive 
significance on the fair income share, but no significance on the fair population share and the 
Gini index. It shows that population size tends to significantly increase the fair population 
share, the Gini index and the difference of the fair division shares by fixed effect models; but 
population growth tends to be insignificant on the fair population share and the Gini index, 
and it shows significant effects to increase the fair income share and insignificance to 
decrease the Gini index and the difference of fair division shares. 
 
Table 6.1 Population Effects on Inequality 
Dependent 
 
Independent 
Fair population 
share 
Fair income share Difference of fair 
division shares 
Gini index 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
popb 0.091 
(2.52) 
.0975 
(3.31) 
0.0647 
(1.45) 
-.0374 
(-1.7) 
.0264 
(0.55) 
.084 
(2.13) 
0.0999 
(1.99) 
.1424 
(3.25) 
popw .03514  
(1.62) 
.0186 
(0.84) 
.0501 
(1.89) 
.0899 
(3.62) 
-.0222 
(-0.81) 
-.0492 
(-1.77) 
-.0137 
(-0.48) 
-.0373 
(-1.27) 
 
Both the Gini index and the fair division point show the same fact that income inequality 
increases in GDP within and between countries. Above empirical results abide by the 
empirical results of the increasing wage inequality since 1970s in developed countries 
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(Acemoglu, 2002; Heathcote, et al., 2009). Atkinson, et al. (2010) have got the similar results 
that employ the top percentile income to measure the income inequality. But these results 
differ from some other empirical results, (Braulke (1983), Galor and Tsiddon (1996), Nielsen 
and Aiderson (1997), Sala-I-Martin (2006)).  
 
6.2 Development Effects of Income Inequality 
If the above fact that income inequality increases in GDP per capita has been an event of 
efficient allocation of resources, then we should be able to find the development effects of 
income inequality in the panel. Considering there might be many transitory noises on 
economic development, we would expect that an efficient income inequality regarding 
development is optimal in the long run to maximize GDP per capita over time and across 
countries. 
Employing model (5.3) in section 5, we explore the empirical evidence of income 
inequality on development. (5.3) is a dynamic panel model, Arellano and Bond(1991) give a 
consistent and efficient GMM method to estimate it. We use two types of metric for income 
inequality: one employs only one measurement of income inequality as shown in the Table 
6.2.1 ~ Table 6.2.3 in the Appendix; the other type, called hybrid metric, takes both the Gini 
index and one of the fair division shares as  shown in Table 6.2.4 in the Appendix. We also 
discuss the different effects between rich economies and poor economies for each model. 
 
6.2.1 Development Effects of the Gini Index 
Table 6.2.1b below presents the empirical results for the GMM regressions using the 
Gini index to describe inequality. Regressions with either explanatory gdpb and popb or 
gdpw and popw give very similar results except of the estimation sizes.  
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Table 6.2.1b GMM Regression of GDPb on the Gini Index
3
 
     Dependent                
Independent  
GDPb Per Capita 
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample  
gdpb L1. 1.0032(44.04) .9098(36.99) .9758(70.89) 
popb -.0347(-0.50) .1306(3.99) .0472(2.37) 
g  -.0023 (-0.00) .5029(3.06) .1934(3.1) 
2g  -.0234 (-0.25) -.6587(-2.63) -.2236(-2.83) 
Intercept .0132 (0.63) -.0834(-2.92) -.0349(-2.88) 
g  \ 0.3818(11.96) 0.4326(10.41) 
The value in parenthesis is for the statistics of the regression. The panel covers total 32 countries and 
278 dynamic observations, in which he subsample of rich economies (gdpb>0.26) includes 14 countries 
and 132 observations; the subsample of poor economies (gdpb<0.26) includes 22 countries and 146 
observations.  
 
The regression results in Table 6.2.1b and Table 6.2.1w in the Appendix are summarized 
as follows: 
 Given the history of GDP per capita, current GDP per capita is an inverted U-shape function 
of income inequality either for the entire sample or rich countries, so that there is a 
development-optimal income inequality over time and across (rich) countries; 
 But poor countries do not show optimal Gini index for development; 
 For the entire sample or rich countries, both population and its growth play positive 
significance; but population size shows insignificant effects and population growth shows 
positive significance in poor countries; 
 There is significant and negative constant effect on development in the entire sample and rich 
countries. 
 
6.2.2 Development Effects of the Fair Division Shares 
Table 6.2.2b below shows the GMM regression results for using the fair division shares. 
Table 6.2.2b is for the models that both fair population share and fair income share take 
quadratic form, where fair population share does not show strong significance for entire 
sample. The significance of fair division shares present if we just apply one of them to 
quadratic form, which shows in Table 6.2.3b in the Appendix.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 Highlighted values denote the significance at 5% confidence level, and the same for all tables hereafter.  
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Table 6.2.2b GMM Regression GDPb on the Fair Division Shares 
Dependent                
Independent  
GDPb Per Capita  
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample  
gdpb L1. 1.0017(42.3) .9307(42.00) .9936(82.22) 
popb .00007(0.00) .0690(2.5) .0139(0.73) 
l
P  .2207(0.62) -.4390 (-0.54) .4602(1.69) 
2
lP  -.1462(-0.56) .4610(0.69) -.3235(-1.53) 
lW  .8599(1.97) .0789(0.54) .1951(1.82) 
2
lW  -1.0628(-1.82) -.1058(-0.72) -.2148(-1.94) 
Intercept -.2490(-1.75) .09888(0.4) -.1979(-2.41) 

lP  / / 0.7113(11.43) 

lW  0.4045(15.04) / 0.4541(13.0) 
 
We summarize the results in Table 6.2.2b and Table 6.2.2w in the Appendix as follows: 
 There is development optimal fair division shares for entire sample, but no optimal fair 
division shares for rich countries; 
 There is development optimal fair income share, but no optimal fair population share for poor 
countries; 
 Population size and its growth play positive and significant effects on development for rich 
countries, but population size plays insignificance in entire sample and poor subsample; 
 Population growth (popw) presents positive and significant effects on development for entire 
sample and any subsamples. 
The question in the above models is that developing economies do not present 
development-optimal Gini index, but developed economies do; and fair division shares show 
no development-optimal values for developed countries but developing economies do show 
optimum income share regarding aggregate per capita income.  
We may doubt either the data or the approximation of the fair division point has some 
problems. All developing economies didn’t have long periods of observations, and only a few 
developed economies had long periods of observations in the sample, which is possibly one 
of the reasons of losing the development effects of inequality. Actually following section 7 
shows the growth effects of inequality performs perfectly about the growth-optimum 
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inequality since it is a short run effect. Another problem could be the slope of defining the 
fair division point, which could be different between developing and developed economies.  
 
6.2.3 Hybrid Models for the Development Effects of Inequality 
The GMM regression results of hybrid models are reported in Table 6.2.4w~b in the 
Appendix. It shows the following results: 
 There are development-optimal inequalities measured by the hybrid metric of the Gini index 
and the fair division shares for entire sample and the subsample of rich countries; 
 Population size plays positive significance for rich countries, but insignificance in entire 
sample and poor countries; 
 Population growth (regarding popw) shows positive significance for entire sample and any 
subsamples. 
It seems that the hybrid metric performs better than the fair division shares because we 
can find develop-optimal inequality in both the entire and the subsample of rich countries.  
There is another problem among these empirical results of the different models, that is, 
the optimal income inequality differs across models within a sample. Since both the fair 
division point and the Gini index each does not uniquely describe Lorenz curve, so that they 
may give different optimal inequalities in the hybrid models from the models of either the 
Gini index or the fair division point, this is the one reason; the other one could be the problem 
of data quality. Because this is a very unbalanced panel with gaps and short periods, the panel 
data has only 32 countries and 278 observations, which may be not big enough to expose 
significant effects of the long run. Table 6.2.5 below summarizes the development-optimal 
inequality by the GMM regressions with explanatory gdpb and popb. 
 
Table 6.2.5 Development-Optimum Inequality
4
 
Measure of Inequality Gini
*
 
pl
*
,   wl
* 
Gini
*
, pl
* 
Gini
*
 , wl
* 
Entire Sample  
0.433 0.711, 0.454 0.374, / 0.522, 0.483 
Rich Countries  
0.382 
/, / 
0.352, / 0.411, 0.492 
Poor Countries  
/ 
/, 0.404 
/, 0.704 /, 0.419 
                                                          
4
 The result of development-optimum income inequality conforms to the Corollary 3.3 in Shao (2010) in a 
framework of new neoclassical model economy. 
33 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
Income inequality presents significant effects on economic development. There is 
development-optimal income inequality over time and across countries, and so that both high 
and low inequality can be a bad event for an economy comparing its potential development-
optimal inequality. Specifically, the entire sample and rich countries show optimal 
development at an appropriate inequality of income distribution; developing economies may 
not show development-optimal income inequality, which depends on the measurement of 
inequality; specifically, developing countries do not show development-optimal Gini index, 
but there is development-optimal inequality jointly measured by the Gini index and the fair 
division shares. 
The fair division point of income distribution gives clear policy implications that a 
change of either the fair population share or the fair income share could lead to an 
improvement of efficiency toward the development-optimal income inequality; developing 
economies do not share with developed economies the same properties of inequality on 
development and thus neither their polices about income distribution.  
Population size plays positive significance on development in rich countries, but it is 
insignificant for poor countries. The difference of development effects from population size 
could come from the differences of human capital among countries.  
Population growth presents significant and positive effect on development in the 
countries of entire sample and any subsamples. But it is not clear within the reduce form of 
models why population growth significantly enhances development in developing economies 
and population size plays the opposite. It is probably because that development induces 
population growth within a developing economy and a larger population size shows negative 
effects on development between developing economies.  
 
7. Growth Effects of Income Inequality 
Section 6 shows that income inequality has significant effects on economic development, 
but how does this happen? There should be many channels in microeconomic level to bridge 
development and income inequality; on macroeconomic level, growth rate of GDP per capita 
can be a direct bridge leading a short run event to long run impact. If we take the optimal 
inequality for development as a long-run equilibrium of income distribution, then, the optimal 
inequality for growth is the event of income distribution in short run. 
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To regress growth rate of GDP on income inequality, GDP per capita will be controlled 
for since we know total production function has diminishing returns to inputs, thus we let 
GDP per capita take quadratic form which allows growth rate varies according to 
development. 
This section will study this topic by three types of model corresponding to the 
measurement of inequality, which is the Gini index, the fair division point, and the hybrid 
measurement of the Gini index and the fair division shares. 
 
7.1 Growth Effects of Inequality by the Gini Index 
Employing the functional form (5.2), we can test the growth effects of the Gini index by 
fixed effect and random effect models, the Hausman test shows that random effect models are 
preferred to fixed effect models assuming no endogeneity problem; actually we can see in the 
regressions that the correlation between the error terms and covariates are pretty small in the 
fixed effects regression. Assuming the differences of base population and aggregate 
productivity, Table 7.1w~b in the Appendix presents the regression results, which are 
summarized as follows: 
 There is growth-optimal Gini index for both the entire panel and the subsample of poor 
countries, but no growth-optimal Gini index for developed countries. The optimal Gini index 
is between 0.365 for entire sample and 0.359 for poor countries; 
 Population size and its growth present insignificant roles for growth in entire sample and any 
subsamples; thus either population size or growth would not be an issue for growth; 
 Growth rate of aggregate productivity is significantly a U-shape in development for the entire 
sample; both poor countries and developed countries could have high growth, but those 
median developed countries may have lower growth rate; 
 There is no significant constant effects on growth in the model; 
 The consistent and efficient random effect model explains about 28.7% between variations of 
growth for the entire panel of countries, about 26.6% for poor countries. The within R
2
 is 
pretty small for the both samples.  
Figure 7.1b below shows the fitted growth of random effect regression with explanatory 
gdpb and popb. 
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Section 7.2 shows that the fair division point does a much better job than the Gini index 
in explaining growth, and the regression models are very convincing by the Hausman test. 
 
7.2 Growth Effects of Inequality by the Fair Division Point 
We employ the model (5.2) as well in this section and use the fair division point to 
describe income inequality. The Hausman test shows that random effect models are always 
consistent and efficient in all these growth models. Assuming the differences of base 
population and aggregate productivity, Table 7.2b in Appendix presents the regression 
results, which are summarized as follows. 
 There is growth-optimal fair division point for entire panel of countries, but there is only 
growth-optimal fair population share and no optimal fair income share for poor countries; the 
optimal fair population share is 0.666, and the optimal fair division of income share is 
between 0.489 for the entire panel; 
 There is the “worst” fair population share in developed economies, which is 0.575; 
 There are significant and negative constant effects on growth for entire sample and poor 
economies, but significant and positive constant effects for developed economies; 
 GDP per capita has no significant effect on growth, even if there is some effect, it is negative 
for developing economies and positive for developed countries; 
 Both popb and popw show no significance on growth, thus either population size or growth 
would not be an issue for growth; 
-.02 
0 
.02 
.04 
.06 
.08 
fitrebgrowth_
g 
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 g 
Figure 7.1b Fitted Growth by Random Effects, Gini, explanatory GDPb 
and popw 
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 The model accounts for 26.34% between variation, and 2.61% within variation of growth in 
the entire sample; 25.1% between variation, and 3.2% within variation of growth in the 
sample of poor economies when assuming gdpb and popb. The between R
2
 41.9% and within 
R
2
 is 3.15% for entire sample, and between R
2
 is 38.43% and within R
2
 is 3.84% for poor 
countries when assuming gdpw and popw. 
Above results do not change even if we use level form for one of the fair division shares 
and quadratic form for the other fair division share. 
Both the fair division point and the Gini index present significant effects on growth, but 
there are also some differences between the two measurements in explaining growth. Table 
7.1b and Table 7.2b present the following differences: 
 In developed economies, there is no growth-optimal Gini index, but there is a significant and 
the “worst” fair population share, which is between 0.575. The model with the fair division 
point accounts for about 53.1% between variation, but the model with Gini accounts for only 
11.2% between variation for developed economies; 
 The significance of GDP per capita is reduced in the model of using the fair division point 
instead of using the Gini index;  
 The constant effects are insignificant in the model with the Gini index, but it is significant 
and negative in developing economies, and significant and positive in developed economies 
in the model with the fair division point; 
Thus, the fair division shares give more information than the Gini index.  
Figure 7.2.1 below graphs the random effect estimation of growth rate using explanatory 
gdpb and popb for entire sample, where GDP per capita was 0.254 and population index was 
0.9192. 
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Actually, the fair division point ignores redistribution within group and the Gini index 
may fail to tell redistribution between groups, but a hybrid metric is possible to do a better 
job than a single one of them in explaining growth. Following section 7.3 does this exercise. 
 
7.3 Growth Effects of Inequality by the Hybrid Metric  
Now we discuss the final functional form of (5.2), which assumes that simultaneously 
there are growth-optimal Gini index and one of the fair division shares, letting the other 
dimension of fair division point be undetermined. We employ the Hausman test to see if 
random effects regression is consistent and efficient; otherwise both fixed effect and random 
effect models will be reported. Table 7.3w~b in the Appendix reports the regression results, 
which are summarized as follows: 
 There is growth-optimal inequality jointly described by the Gini index and the fair income 
share in the entire sample, the optimal Gini is 0.3991, and optimal fair income share is 
0.5092;  
 In those developed countries, there is optimal fair income share, which is between 0.4857, 
and no optimal Gini index with the hybrid metric; 
 In those poor economies, there is only the optimal Gini coefficient which is 0.4044, and no 
optimal fair income share with the hybrid metric; 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Population Share
Figure 8.2.1 Random Effects Estimation of Growth on Fair Division Point 
Income Share 
G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
 o
f 
G
D
P
 p
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
Figure 7.2.1 
38 
 
 Population size and population growth do not show significance on growth; 
 Development level does not show much significance on growth in the subsamples of either 
developing or developed economies; but it shows significant negative effects for developing 
countries (gdpb<0.4457) and significant positive effects on growth for rich countries 
(gdpb>0.4457) in the entire sample; 
 The between R2 is 40.4% for the entire sample, 41.3% for developing economies, 29.9% for 
developed economies, and all of within R
2
 are around 2%. 
The regression results for the hybrid measurement of the Gini index and the fair 
population share in Table 7.4w~b in the Appendix are summarized as follows:  
 There is only growth-optimal Gini index and no growth-optimal fair population share for the 
entire sample when the Gini index is controlled for; 
 For those developed economies, there are jointly the growth-optimal Gini index and the 
growth-worst fair population share;  
 We don’t see growth-optimal hybrid metric of the Gini index and the fair population share for 
developing economies, but for given one of the two dimensions, there is growth-optimal 
inequality by the other dimension (refer to Table 7.4bb in the Appendix). 
Now we report the R
2
 for above growth models in Table 7.5 below, which shows that the 
Gini index and the fair division point jointly explain much higher between variation of 
growth than either one of the two metrics, but the within R
2
 is pretty small for entire sample 
and the two subsamples, which could be caused by the short periods of observations in each 
country.  
Table 7.5 R
2
 by Sample and Inequality Metric in Growth Models
5
 
Measure of Inequality g  pl,  wl g , pl g, wl 
For 
Entire 
Sample
 
Within R
2 
0.01 0.026 0.026 0.022 
Between R
2 
0.287 0.263 0.417 0.404 
Total R
2 
0.098 0.095 0.126 0.119 
For 
Rich 
Countries 
Within R
2 
0.025 0.009 0.016 0.018 
Between R
2 
0.112 0.531 0.568 0.299 
Total R
2 
0.049 0.092 0.103 0.064 
 
Table 7.6 below summarizes all growth-optimal inequalities for entire panel and 
subsamples assuming the differences of base population and base productivity.  
                                                          
5  R2 values in Table 7.5 are from the random effect regressions with explanatory gdpb and popb. 
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Table 7.6 Growth-Optimum Inequality 
Measure of Inequality Gini
*
 
pl
*
,   wl
* 
Gini
*
, pl
* 
Gini
*
 , wl
* 
Entire Sample  0.365 0.666, 0.489 0.278,     / 0.399, 0.509 
Rich Countries  / 0.575
6, 0.449 0.314, 0.5817 /, 0.486 
Poor Countries  0.359 0.683,    / /,        / 0.404,  / 
 
If we compare Table 6.2.5 and Table 7.6, we find that the optimum of income inequality 
in a subsample depends on the measurement, but the entire sample does present optimal 
inequality regarding either growth or development.  
There is optimal income inequality measured by the Gini index or fair division point 
regarding either growth or development for the entire sample; Rich countries do not show 
growth-optimal Gini index, and no optimal fair population share, but they have the 
development-optimal Gini index and growth-optimal fair income share; poor countries seems 
to have either growth-optimal Gini index or fair population share, but no development-
optimal Gini index and no growth-optimal fair income share. 
 
7.4 Summary 
We have following findings about the growth effects of income inequality when we 
apply both the Gini and the fair division point to measuring income inequality: 
 There is growth-optimal inequality measured by the Gini index, the fair division shares, or 
the hybrid measurement of the two metrics for the entire panel of countries; 
 For those rich countries, there is growth-optimal inequality described by the fair income 
share; and there is the “worst” fair population share that leads to lowest growth rate, but the 
Gini index does not give much implication on growth;  
 For those poor countries, there is growth-optimal inequality measured by the Gini index, or 
fair population share;  
 Population size and its growth are insignificant for growth in entire sample and any 
subsamples; 
 The consistent and efficient random effect model explains the between variations of growth 
about 41.75% for the entire sample, and 56.8% for rich countries by the hybrid measurement 
                                                          
6
, 
7
, The red numbers (0.5747, 0.5813) are the “growth-worst” fair population share in the model. 
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of the Gini index and fair population share. A measurement of inequality with the fair 
population share can give a much higher between R
2
. 
It requires further work to explain why income inequality does not explain as much 
within variations as between variations of growth. This could be caused by two causes: one is 
that the unbalanced panel data does not include sufficient time periods in each country, the 
other one could be that income inequality has lag effect on growth. Once we have sufficient 
time periods for each country, we can do dynamic growth models to see if there is significant 
improvement in explaining the growth effect of income inequality within an eocnomy.  
 
7.5 Policy Implication 
There are very striking policy implications according to the fair division point. First, the 
theory of fair division point of income distribution supports the tax policy that tax rate varies 
according to the fair division point in order to respond to the growth effects of fair division 
shares.  
Second, there is optimum income inequality regarding either aggregate productivity or 
growth rate of GDP, only a change (either increase or decrease) of inequality towards the 
optimum inequality will be an improvement of the economic effects of inequality.  
Third, developing economies show different optimum inequality from that in developed 
economies, so that a developing country should not copy development policies from 
developed economies regarding income distribution.  
Fourth, there is the growth-worst fair population share that results in the lowest growth in 
developed economies, so that a deviation from the “worst” fair population share would 
improve resource allocations and enhance growth for a developed economy.  
 
8. Conclusion 
We introduce the “fair division point” to describe inequality of income distribution. It 
shows unit slope on a Lorenz curve and involves the fair income share and the fair population 
share. The fair division point approximates the balanced income inequality that shows equal 
growth of income from both high and low income groups in the economy. The households 
which are income-ordered within the fair population share are called low income population; 
the others are called high income population. The Gini index can be practically interpreted as 
the difference of the fair population share and the fair income share. 
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Employing a panel data of countries, the analysis shows that a country’s low income 
population will decrease (the fair population share drops slightly) as the country grows; and 
at the same time, those low income households are relatively worse off (the fair income share 
decreases).  Inversely, as an economy grows rich, there are more low income households (the 
fair population share rises), but those low income households are relatively better off (the fair 
income share rises and GDP per capita increases). Overall, both the Gini index and the 
difference between the fair population share and the fair income share have been increasing, 
therefore, income inequality increases as an economy is getting richer. But there is no 
evidence for Kuznets hypothesis in this study. 
Income inequality presents significant effects on economic development. For the entire 
panel of countries, there is development-optimum income inequality measured by either the 
Gini index and/or the fair division shares regarding aggregate income per capita, so that both 
high and low inequality could harm an economy as we compare with its potential 
development-optimum inequality. The development-optimum Gini index was about 0.433, 
the optimum fair population share was about 0.711, and the optimum fair income share was 
about 0.454. Subsamples of the panel show different development-optimum inequalities. 
Developed economies show development-optimum Gini index, but no optimal fair division 
point; developing economies show development-optimum fair income share but no optimal 
Gini index.  
The analysis demonstrates growth-optimum income inequality for the entire panel of 
countries and any subsamples. Both high and low income inequalities might impede growth. 
But in developed economies there are the growth-optimum fair income share and the growth-
worst fair population share that leads to the lowest growth; in developing economies there is 
growth-optimum Gini index or fair population share.  
Growth-optimal inequality is different from development-optimal inequality that could 
be due to the differences of time horizon and regression method. Growth-optimum inequality 
responds to efficient allocation in the short run, but development-optimum inequality is an 
efficient allocation in the long run.  
The fair division shares give more information than the Gini index in growth models. In 
developed economies, there is no growth-optimal Gini index, but there is a significant and the 
“worst” fair population share, which is between 0.575. The growth models of fair division 
point account for 53.1% between-variations, but only 11.2% between-variations are 
accounted for by the growth models of the Gini index for developed economies. The 
significance of GDP per capita is reduced in the growth models of using the fair division 
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point instead of using the Gini index to express inequality. The constant effects are 
insignificant in the growth model with the Gini index, but significant and positive in 
developed economies and negative in developing economies and the entire sample in the 
growth model with the fair division point.  
Population size presents positive significance on development for the entire sample and 
those rich countries, but negative insignificance for those poor countries. The difference of 
development effects from population size could come from the differences of aggregate 
human capital among countries. Population growth presents significant and positive effects 
on development for all countries. But population size and its growth do not show significant 
effects on growth rate of GDP per capita.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 4.1.2 Correlation between Variables 
 x y g growth gdpb gdpw popb popw 
x 1        
y 
-
0.2168 1       
g 0.8985 -0.5716 1      
growth -0.0221 0.1811 -0.1077 1     
gdpb -0.5327 -0.0046 -0.4045 -0.0792 1    
gdpw 0.2335 -0.0878 0.238 -0.1989 0.2412 1   
popb 0.1242 -0.388 0.3144 -0.1149 0.2048 -0.0235 1  
popw -0.1802 0.2613 -0.2614 -0.1011 0.2546 0.636 -0.2843 1 
 
Figure 4.1 below is an example of Lorenz curve for Latvia in 1998, following is the 
calculation on Matlab for its fair division point. 
 
Figure  4.1 
 
Then, here are the commands to calculate a fair division point (x, y) in Matlab for 1998 
Latovia: 
Y=[ 9.367   -24.567    25.124   -12.732   3.8429   -0.0755  0.0002   ] 
Dc=polyder(Y) 
One=[0  0  0  0  0  -1] 
Ec=Dc+One 
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x=roots(Ec) 
y=polyval(Y, x) 
The output of above calculation is (0.6856, 0.4542), at which the slope of  Lorenz curve 
is unit; it means that 68.56% of low income households hold 45.42% total disposable income 
in 1998 in Latvia. 
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          Figure  4.2.5 Observations of Fair Income Share Against Fair Population Share 
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Table 4.2.1 Regression of the Gini Index on the Fair Division Point 
Independent Variables FE RE MLE  FE 
Pl 35.1911 (2.17) 1.2346 (40.60) 1.0894 (29.88) 
Pl
2 
-80.569 (-2.19)   
Pl
3 
84.6778 (2.29)   
Pl
4 
-33.224 (-2.4)   
Wl 55.6946 (22.31) -.7724(-22.87) -.6641 (-21.72) 
Wl
2 
-195.729(-23.09)   
Wl
3 
288.2418 (23.02)   
Wl
4 
-151.656(-22.42)   
Intercept -11.3374 (-4.22) -.1325(-6.96) -.07958 (-3.54) 
corr(u_i, Xb)   0.086  0.7734 
Within R
2 
0.9645  0.6801 
Between R
2 
0.9975  0.9810 
Overall  R
2 
0.9952  0.9490 
Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Cells left empty denote that the corresponding variables 
are not included in the model. The Hausman test shows that RE models are not consistent.  
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Table 4.2.2 RE Regression of the Fair Division Point on the Gini Index 
        
Dependent  
                 
Independent 
Wl Pl 
RE MLE RE MLE 
g 
30.835(3.46) 30.8523 (3.47) 
29.9674(4.66) 29.9724 (4.69) 
g
2
 
-161.01(-3.39) -161.101(-3.41) 
-154.547(-4.50) -154.574(-4.53) 
g
3
 
397.4945(3.24) 397.7388(3.25) 386.528(4.35) 386.6121(4.38) 
g
4
 
-468.862(-3.05) -469.178(-3.06) -462.777(-4.15) -462.912(-4.18) 
g
5
 
212.3269 (2.83) 212.484(2.84) 213.426(3.93) 213.5093(3.95) 
Intercept 
-1.8143(-2.79) -1.8154(-2.81) 
-1.6790(-3.59) -1.6793(-3.61) 
FE corr(u_i, Xb) 0.0082  0.282  
H-Test Prob(chi2) 0.6176 (3.54)  0.0634 (10.45)  
Within R
2 0.1352  0.4016  
Between R
2 0.5258  0.9056  
Overall  R
2 0.3702  0.8296  
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Table 4.2.3 Regression between the Fair Division Shares Wl and Pl 
 
Table 6.1.1b Regression of the Gini Index on Real GDPb and Popb 
Dependent 
Independent  
Gini  Index (g) 
Robust OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
gdpb  -1.4312(-8.04) 0.0686(2.86) .03035(1.31) 
2gdpb  2.4395(4.85)   
3gdpb  -1.264(-3.19)   
popb 0.2018(11.42) 0.0999(1.99) .1423(3.25) 
Intercept 0.5314(30.71) 0.3351(42.61) .3600(26.58) 
corr(u_i,Xb)  -0.1424  
H-Test Prob(Chi2)   0.000(246.52) 
Within R
2 
 0.044 0.0393 
Between R
2 
 0.016 0.0098 
Overall  R
2 
0.4056 0.0107 0.0602 
GDP is the real GDP in 2005 constant price by chain method and has been converted by PPP. Chi2 
statistic of hausman test is not positive definite for the both models.  
 
Independent 
Variable 
Pl Wl 
 RE FE RE FE 
Wl 3.5985(6.86) 2.9059(4.99)   
Wl
2
 -2.6179(-6.60) -1.9506(-4.32)   
Pl   .8870(4.03) .9725(4.46) 
Pl
2 
  -.7157(-2.87) -.7946(-3.22) 
Intercept -.8396(-4.87) -.6736(-3.6) .4225(8.63) .3903(8.19) 
FE corr(u_i, Xb)  -0.6300  -0.4289 
Within R
2 
0.1225 0.1440 0.1298 0.1298 
Between R
2 
0.0029 0.1274 0.1585 0.1584 
Overall  R
2 
0.0086 0.0132 0.0536 0.0537 
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Table 6.1.2b Regression of the Fair Population Share on Real GDPb and Popb 
 Dependent        
Independent  
Fair Population Share (Pl) 
Robust OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
gdpb  -0.9828(-9.29) -0.3154(-4.57) -.4106(-5.85) 
2gdpb  1.5844(5.3) 0.9121(5.15) 1.039(5.71) 
3gdpb  -0.7699(-3.27) -0.6007(-4.46) -.6627(-4.77) 
popb 0.0747(7.12) 0.0908(2.52) .0974(3.31) 
Intercept 0.7700(74.9) 0.6512(71.53) .6826(65.42) 
FE corr(u_i,Xb)  -0.2794  
H-Test Prob(Chi2)   0.000(212.79) 
Within R
2 
 0.1168 0.1065 
Between R
2 
 0.0031 0.0931 
Overall  R
2 
0.4346 0.0054 0.0524 
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Figure 6.1.1b  Robust OLS Fitted Gini Against GDPb 
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Table 6.1.3b Regression of the Fair Income Share on GDPb and Popb 
   Dependent                   
Independent 
Fair Income Share  (Wl) 
Robust OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
gdpb  0.1748(2.61) -0.3628(-4.25) -.2571(-3.3) 
2gdpb  -0.4000(-2.11) 0.8954(4.09) .7189(3.45) 
3gdpb  0.2598(1.74) -0.5733(-3.44) -.4720(-2.94) 
popb -0.0849(-12.76) 0.0647(1.45) -.0373(-1.7) 
Intercept 0.3746(57.46) 0.4041(35.9) .4051(44.87) 
FE corr(u_i,Xb)  -0.7611  
H-Test Prob(chi2)   0.000 (21.37) 
Within R
2 
 0.0494 0.0367 
Between R
2 
 0.1633 0.0145 
Overall  R
2 
0.1600 0.1386 0.0670 
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Figure 6.1.2b  Random Effect Fitted Fair Population Share Against 
GDPb 
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Figure  6.1.3b  Robust OLS Fitted Fair Income Share Against GDPb 
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Table 6.1.4b Regression of Difference Between the Fair Division Shares on GDPb and Popb 
Dependent 
Independent 
Difference Between Fair Division Shares          ll WP   
Robust OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
gdpb  -1.1218(-8.1) .04634(2.01) .0022(0.1) 
2gdpb  1.9217(4.91)   
3gdpb  -1.0003(-3.25)   
popb .1565(11.38) .02644(0.55) .0840(2.13) 
Intercept .3910(29.05) .2477(32.82) .2649(23.94) 
FE corr(u_i,Xb)  -0.2531  
H-Test Prob(Chi2)   0.000(60.24) 
Within R
2 
 0.0139 0.0736 
Between R
2 
 0.1367 0.0353 
Overall  R
2 
0.3846 0.0168 0.0736 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.2 
.25 
.
.3 
.35 
.4 
fitolsbPl_Wl 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 
gdpb 
Figure 6.1.4b  Robust OLS Fitted Difference of Fair Division Shares Against GDPb 
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Table 6.2.1w GMM Regression of GDPw on the Gini Index 
    Dependent                
Independent  
GDPw Per Capita 
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample  
gdpwL1. .943(28.53) .909 (33.32) .948(45.76) 
popw .191(2.16) .219 (3.5) .155 (3.03) 
g  .196(0.52) 1.017 (3.18) .590 (2.99) 
2g  -.366(-0.88) -1.37(-2.81) -.761(-3.01) 
Intercept -.129(-1.23) -.294(-3.62) -.191(-3.42) 
g  / 0.371(13.06) 0.389(11.14) 
The panel covers total 32 countries and 278 dynamic observations, in which the subsample of rich 
economies (gdpb>0.26) includes 14 countries and 132 observations; the subsample of poor economies 
(gdpb<0.26) includes 22 countries and 146 observations.  
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Table 6.2.2w GMM Regression of GDPw on the Fair Division Shares 
Dependent                
Independent  
GDPw Per Capita  
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample  
gdpw L1. .9488(29.38) .9412(38.57) .9708(50.64) 
popw .2287(2.56) .0923(1.66) .1033 (2.07) 
l
P  1.235(0.75) -1.526 (-0.94) 1.418 (1.56) 
2
lP  -.8662(-0.71) 1.4289(1.07) -1.049(-1.48) 
lW  2.775(1.39) .1670(0.56) .7075(1.97) 
2
lW  -3.1424(-1.17) -.2238(-0.75) -.7603(-2.04) 
Intercept -1.1861(-1.85) .3483(0.7) -.6853(-2.47) 

lP  / / 0.6758(14.76) 

lW  / / 0.4653(14.8) 
 
 
Table 6.2.3b GMM Regression of GDPb on the Fair Division Shares 
Dependent                
Independent  
GDPb Per Capita 
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample  
gdpb L1. 1.0(42) 1.01(44.18) .932(42.19) .929(41.93) .99(85) .99(83.04) 
popb -.004(-.05) -.024(-0.35) .071(2.57) .0718(2.62) .010(0.53) .021(1.12) 
l
P  .024(0.73) 
.231(0.65) .121(2.91) -.392(-0.48) 
.046(2.03) 
.603(2.29) 
2
lP   
-.17(-0.67)  .429(0.64) 
 
-.431(-2.1) 
lW  .895(2.06) .068(1.57) .073(0.5) -.025(-1.51) .241(2.34) -.01(-0.75) 
2
lW  
-1.1(-1.88) 
 -.099(-0.67)  
-.259(-2.42) 
 
Intercept -.19(-2.05) -.09(-0.83) -.070(-2.09) .106(0.43) -.078(-3.1) -.2(-2.39) 

lP  / / / / / 0.6994 

lW  0.408 / / / 0.465 / 
The value in parenthesis is for the statistics of the regression. The panel covers total 32 
countries and 278 dynamic observations, in which he subsample of rich economies (gdpb>0.26) 
includes 14 countries and 132 observations; the subsample of poor economies (gdpb<0.26) includes 
22 countries and 146 observations.  
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Table 6.2.4w GMM Regression of GDPw on Income Inequality for Hybrid Models 
Dependent                
Independent  
GDPw Per Capita  
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
gdpw L1. .959 
(29.05) 
.951 
(29.38) 
.905 
(33.16) 
.905 
(33.59) 
.953 
(45.40) 
.950 
(46.33) 
popw   .223 
(2.49) 
.233 
(2.6) 
.207 
(3.19) 
.1865 
(2.91) 
.1515 
(2.82) 
.138 
(2.67) 
g
 
-.60 
(-1.04) 
-.04 
(-0.10) 
1.187 
(3.49) 
1.027 
(3.26) 
.624 
(2.22) 
.586 
(2.99) 
g
2 .3796 
(0.55) 
.139 
(0.30) 
-1.72 
(-3.33) 
-1.26 
(-2.6) 
-.944 
(-2.42) 
-.663 
(-2.62) 
Pl 3.44 
(1.37) 
 -3.44 
(-1.95) 
 -.665 
(-0.49) 
 
Pl
2 
-2.31 
(-1.2) 
 2.939 
(2.02) 
 .666 
(0.62) 
 
Wl 
 
3.371 
(1.54)  
.794 
(2.43)  
1.026 
(2.70) 
Wl
2
 
 
-3.72 
(-1.3)  
-.82 
(-2.49)  
-1.06 
(2.69) 
Intercept -1.24 
(-1.6) 
-.908 
(-2.1) 
.7104 
(1.36) 
-.455 
(-4.4) 
-.026 
(-0.07) 
-.423 
(-4.14) 
g
*
 
\ \ 0.3454 0.4062 0.3306 0.4423 
Pl
*
 \ \ 0.5861 \ \ \ 

lW  \ \ \ 0.4826 \ 0.4834 
The panel covers total 32 countries and 278 dynamic observations, in which there are 14 
countries and 132 observations for the subsample of rich countries, 22 countries and 149 observations 
for the subsample of poor countries.  
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Table 6.2.4b GMM Regression of GDPb on Income Inequality for Hybrid Metrics 
Dependent                
Independent  
GDPb Per Capita 
laggedgdpb<0.26 laggedgdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
gdpb 
L1. 
1.0203 
(42.47) 
1.007 
(41.89) 
.9029 
(36.71) 
.8868 
(34.28) 
.9794 
(69.73) 
.9771 
(72.49) 
popb -.04932 
(-0.71) 
-.0177 
(-0.25) 
.1247 
(3.76) 
.1286 
(3.77) 
.0380 
(1.75) 
.0321 
(1.56) 
g
 
-.1844 
(-1.45) 
-.0540 
(-0.64) 
.5470 
(3.15) 
.5316 
(3.15) 
.1695 
(1.89) 
.1808 
(2.96) 
g
2 .1752 
(1.15) 
.0948 
(0.94) 
-.7774 
(-2.95) 
-.6465 
(-2.53) 
-.2268 
(-1.87) 
-.1732 
(-2.2) 
Pl .8860 
(1.64)  
-1.224 
(-1.4)  
.0047 
(0.01)  
Pl
2 
-.6293 
(-1.53)  
1.072 
(1.49)  
.0359 
(0.11)  
Wl 
 
1.072 
(2.28)  
.6185 
(3.78)  
.3665 
(3.20) 
Wl
2
 
 
-1.2803 
(-2.11)  
-.6279 
(-3.78)  
-.3793 
(3.21) 
Intercept -.2563 
(-1.59) 
-.2098 
(-2.26) 
.2671 
(1.03) 
-.2275 
(-4.69) 
-.0427 
(-0.36) 
-.1186 
(-4.08) 
g  
\ \ 0.3518 0.4112 0.3739 0.5219 
Pl
*
 
0.704  \ \ \ \ 

lW  \ 0.4187 \ 0.4925 \ 0.4831 
The panel covers total 32 countries and 278 dynamic observations, in which there are 14 
countries and 132 observations for the subsample of rich countries, 22 countries and 149 
observations for the subsample of poor countries.  
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Table 7.1b RE Regression of Growth on the Gini, Popb and GDPb 
Independent Variable gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.29 Entire Sample 
gdpb 
.0367 (0.18) .0305(0.32) -0.1139(-2.89) 
2gdpb  
-.4148(-0.62) .0042(0.05) 0.1278(2.44) 
popb .0119 (0.65) 
-.0246(-1.29) -0.0094(-0.71) 
g 
.6203(3.57) .4682(1.43) 0.4496(3.33) 
g
2 
-.8639 (-4.14) -.5852(-1.19) -0.6261(-3.77) 
Intercept -.0600(-1.57) 
-.0699 (-1.16) -0.024(0.9) 
FE corr(u_i, Xb) 0.0842 -0.1159 0.2710 
H-Test Prob(Chi2) 0.367(5.42) 0.7178(2.88) 0.7763(2.5) 
Within R
2 
0.0105 
0.0247 
0.0104 
Between R
2 
0.2658 
0.1125 
0.2874 
Overall  R
2 
0.1095 
0.0488 
0.0979 
Optimal  g  0.359(18.97) / 0.3648(16.82) 
There are 212 observations from 24 countries for gdpb>0.29, 308 observations from 
41 countries for gdpb<0.26. 
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Table 7.1w RE Regression of Growth on the Gini, Popw and GDPw 
Independent Variable gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.29 Entire Sample 
gdpw -.0964(-1.56) -.0047(-0.04) -.1133(-2.43) 
2gdpw  .0619(1.36) 
0.0043(0.06) 
.0694(2.13) 
popw -.0345(-1.00) 
0.0112(0.23) 
-.0091(-0.34) 
g .5699(3.38) 
0.3590(1.15) 
.3913(3.11) 
g
2 
-.7702(-3.81) 
-0.4836(-1.03) 
-.5225(-3.41) 
Intercept .0058(0.13) 
-0.0448(-0.55) 
.0155(0.45) 
FE corr(u_i, Xb) -0.0108 -0.3262 -0.0285 
H-Test Prob(Chi2) 0.1183(8.78) 0.0973(9.31) 0.0001(26.95) 
Within R
2 
0.0179 0.0109 0.0159 
Between R
2 
0.2359 0.0104 0.2627 
Overall  R
2 
0.1284 0.0113 0.0865 
Optimal  g  0.370(18.11) / 0.3745(18.02) 
The fixed effect regression for entire sample and rich countries do not show 
significance on the quadratic form of Gini. 
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Table 7.2b RE Regression of Growth on the Fair Division Point, GDPb and Popb 
Independent Variable gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Whole Sample 
gdpb  
-.0773(-0.39) 
-.0858(-1.09) 
-.0674(-1.67) 
2gdpb  .1243(0.19) 
.0979(1.26) 
.0751(1.41) 
popb .0101(0.56) -.0153 (-1.12) -.0065(-0.49) 
Wl 1.2097(1.11) 
.2264(0.79) 
.694(2.29) 
Wl
2
 
-1.185(-0.84) -.2778(-0.89) -.7095(-2.01) 
Pl 2.942(3.87) -2.8901(-1.75) 1.840(3.26) 
Pl
2 
-2.1784(-3.91) 2.5147(1.87) -1.3809(-3.27) 
Intercept 
-1.2287(-3.72) .8284(1.68) -.7251(-3.87) 
FE corr(u_i,Xb) 
-0.0148 -0.1140 -0.3054 
H-Test Prob(chi2) 0.2670(8.8) 
0.4164 (7.12) 0.5522(5.89) 
Within R
2 
0.0321 0.0092 
0.0261 
Between R
2 
0.2508 0.5308 0.2634 
Overall  R
2 
0.1361 0.0925 0.0948 
Pl
* 
0.675(68.97) 
0.5747(23.55)
 
0.666(51.84) 
Wl
*
 
/ / 0.489(10.52) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of GDP in all above regressions. The linear form of GDP 
will lead to negative effects for entire sample and developing economies, positive effects for 
developed economies, but all are insignificant in 90% confidence interval. This is the “worst” 
value of fair population share regarding to growth. 
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Table 7.2w RE Regression of Growth on the Fair Division Point, GDPw and Popw 
Independent 
Variable 
gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Entire  Sample 
gdpw 
-.056(-0.92) 
-.048(-0.39) 
-.093(-2.05) 
2gdpw  .028(0.63) 
.034(0.46) 
.050(1.58) 
popw -.037(-1.08) -.027(-0.6) -.0212(-0.82) 
Wl 1.334(1.23) 
.469(1.75) 
.871(3.16) 
Wl
2
 
-1.369(-0.97) -.522(-1.77) -.907(-2.75) 
Pl 2.731(3.69) -3.970271(-2.45) 1.907(3.95) 
Pl
2 
-2.001(-3.69) 3.389(2.56)
 
-1.406(-3.91) 
Intercept 
-1.137(-3.53) 1.125(2.29) -.747(-4.47) 
FE corr(u_i,Xb) 
0.0862 -0.2485 -0.084 
H-Test Prob(chi2) 0.031(15.44) 
/( -23.46) 0.00(33.42) 
Within R
2 
0.0355 0.0105 
0.0315 
Between R
2 
0.3843 0.4647 0.4189 
Overall  R
2 
0.1642 0.0777 0.1220 
Pl
* 
0.682(63.76) 0.585

(42.18) 0.678(71.35) 
Wl
*
 
/ 0.449(10.55) 0.480(14.14) 
The fixed effect regression for entire sample, rich countries and poor countries do not 
show significance on fair division shares. This is the “worst” value of fair population share 
regarding to growth.  
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Table 7.3b RE Regression of Growth on the Fair Income Shares, the Gini and GDPb 
Independent Variable gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
gdpb  .05563(0.28) -.0796(-0.97) -.0848(-2.18) 
2gdpb  -.3644(-0.56) .0883(1.09) .0951(1.85) 
popb .01888(1.04) -.0198(-1.15) -0.002(-0.18) 
g
2 
-.9502(-4.31) -.4482(-0.98) -.6935(-4.44) 
g .7685(4.17) .4258(1.4) .5536(4.28) 
Wl
2
 
1.089(0.73) -.7291(-2.04) -.8476(-2.3) 
Wl -.5034(-0.43) .7081(2.1) .8632(2.68) 
Intercept -.0774(-0.36) -.2035(-2.04) -.2625(-3.25) 
H-Test Prob (chi2) 0.1645(10.45) 0.7474(4.28) 0.4749(6.57) 
FE  corr(u_i, Xb) -0.1135 -0.2668 -0.3038 
Within R
2 
0.0226 0.0182 0.0218 
Between R
2 
0.4128 0.2986 0.4041 
Overall  R
2 
0.1446 0.0644 0.1191 
g  0.4044 / 0.3991,   
Wl
*
 
/ 0.4857 0.5092 
GDP per capita is still insignificant for subsamples if it takes linear form in above models. 
Gini has significant and positive effects and other explanatory items do not show difference on 
significance and sign if it takes linear form in the subsample of rich economies. Fair income share 
has significant and positive effects and other items do not show difference of significance and sign 
if it takes linear form in the subsample of poor economies. 
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Table 7.3w RE Regression Growth on the Fair Income Shares, the Gini and GDPw 
Independent 
Variable 
gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
gdpw -.0687317(-1.12) -.0857564(-0.69) -.0948953(-2.12) 
2gdpw  .0392584(0.87) .0470697(0.61) .0535933(1.7) 
g
2
 
-.8035143(-3.77) -.3656125(-0.85) -.6762245(-5.09) 
g .677315(3.79) .362981(1.27) .5776307(5.2) 
Wl
2
 
.6238193(0.41) -.9166467(-2.54) -1.178806(-3.52) 
Wl -.1348345(-0.12) .8878724(2.62) 1.188412(4.18) 
popw -.0351753(-1.02) .012146(0.27) -.024338(-0.96) 
Intercept -.0779775(0.12) -.2271746(-2.24) -.3007162(-4.2) 
H-Test Prob (chi2) 0.0258(15.93) 0.4053(7.23) 0.0002(28.54) 
FE  corr(u_i, Xb) -0.0381 -0.2588 -0.1242 
Within R
2 
0.0268 0.0132 0.0283 
Between R
2 
0.4972 0.2787 0.5226 
Overall  R
2 
0.1663 0.0429 0.1373 
g  0.4215 / 0.4271 
Wl
*
 
/ 0.4843 0.5041 
All fixed effect regressions do not show significance on inequality items.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4w Regressions of Growth on the Fair Population Share, the Gini and GDPw 
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Independent 
Variable 
gdpb<0.26 
FE 
gdpb>0.26 
RE 
Entire Sample 
RE 
gdpw 
-.085029(-1.15) .0146069(0.12) -.0923854(-2.07) 
2gdpw  .0841076(1.59) -.004474(-0.06) .0516132(1.64) 
g
2
 
.5262248(1.04) -.9494806(-2.06) -.7758644(-3.84 
g 
-.6202943(-1.35) .5646259(1.85) .4224562(2.85) 
Pl
2 
-2.256247(-1.87) 4.163199(2.91) -.1418632(-0.28) 
Pl 3.291752(2.04) -4.843631(-2.79) .4985642(0.77) 
popw 
-.0538683(-1.23) -.0255697(-0.55) -.017651(-0.70) 
Intercept -.9297213(-1.87) 
1.365678(2.64) -.2175686(-1.12) 
H-Test Prob(chi2) -0.085 
0.0020(22.57) 0.0001(31.31) 
FE  corr(u_i, Xb)  -0.0966 -0.0068 
Within R
2 
0.0558 
0.0173 0.0301 
Between R
2 
0.0451 0.4847 0.5207 
Overall  R
2 
0.0659 
0.0890 0.1409 
g   0.2973 0.2723 
Pl
* 
0.7295 0.5817
 
/ 
Fixed effect regression for entire sample, rich countries do not show significance on 
inequality items. This is the “worst” value of fair population share regarding to growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4b RE Regression of Growth on the Fair Population Share, the Gini and GDPb 
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Independent 
Variable 
gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
2gdpb  
-.2334(-0.35) -.0837(-1.08) .0928 (1.82) 
gdpb  .0250(0.13) .1003(1.31) -.0814 (-2.11) 
popb .0147(0.81) -.0100(-0.75) -.0027(-0.24) 
g
2
 
-.7190(-2.4) -.9088(-1.94) -.7494 (-3.37) 
g 
.3334(1.40) .5700(1.90) .4166 (2.53) 
Pl
2 
-1.014(-1.28) 3.612(2.51) -.2077 (-0.38) 
Pl 
1.6941(1.59) -4.2002(-2.41) .5217(0.74) 
Intercept -.6485(-1.99) 1.1749(2.29) 
-.2488 (-1.17) 
H-Test Prob (chi2) 0.0715(13.02) 0.3465(7.84) 0.3215 (8.13) 
FE  corr(u_i, Xb) 
-0.0651 0.027 
-0.1661 
Within R
2 
0.0265 0.0156 
0.0257 
Between R
2 
0.3805 0.5681 
0.4175 
Overall  R
2 
0.1509 0.1034 0.126 
g
*
 
/ 0.3136 0.2779 
Pl
* 
/ 0.5813
 / 
GDP per capita is still insignificant for subsamples if it takes linear form in above models 
and other explanatory items do not show difference on significance and sign. This is a 
“worst” value of fair population share regarding to growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4bb  RE Regression of Growth on the Fair Population Share, the Gini and GDPb 
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Independent  gdpb<0.26 gdpb>0.26 Entire Sample 
2gdpb  -.0704 
(-0.36) 
-.4259 
(-0.65) 
.1017 
(1.31) 
.0934 
(1.16) 
.07497 
(1.39) 
.09406 
(1.85) 
gdpb  .10278 
(0.16) 
.07544 
(0.38) 
-.0893 
(-1.14) 
-.0829 
(-1.02) 
-.0670 
(-1.63) 
-.0822 
(-2.14) 
g
2
 
 
-.9965 
(-4.79)  
-.52279 
(-1.15)  
-.81066 
(-5.16) 
g  -.22277 
(-3.99) 
.54628 
(3.18) 
-.00598 
(-0.12) 
.34715 
(1.16) 
-.1205 
(-2.76) 
.45827 
(3.68) 
Pl
2 
-2.3839 
(-4.32)  
2.4467 
(1.82)  
-1.434 
(-3.4)  
Pl 3.498 
(4.67) 
.3370 
(3.6) 
-2.8004 
(-1.72) 
.1751 
(2.06) 
2.0654 
(3.72) 
.2545 
(3.94) 
popb .00574 
(0.32) 
.0160 
(0.89) 
-.01673 
(-1.22) 
-.01904 
(-1.13) 
-.0078 
(-0.56) 
-.00215 
(-0.19) 
Intercept -1.131 
(-4.4) 
-.2394 
(-3.84) 
.84731 
(1.71) 
-.11344 
(-1.66) 
-.6425 
(-3.48) 
-.1701 
(-3.87) 
H-Test 
Prob(chi2) 
0.5003 
(5.35) 
0.0792 
(11.31) 
0.2778 
(7.49) 
0.6276 
(4.36) 
0.854 
(2.63) 
0.3861 
(6.34) 
FE  corr(u_i, Xb) 0.0039 -0.1051 -0.2892 -0.310 -0.2452 -0.2046 
Within R
2 
0.0344 0.021 0.0066 0.0161 0.027 0.0247 
Between R
2 
0.2405 0.427 0.5264 0.3177 0.2483 0.4267 
Overall  R
2 
0.1346 0.1462 0.0883 0.0653 0.0934 0.1261 
g   0.274    0.2829 
Pl
* 
0.7337  0.5723
  0.72  
GDP per capita is still insignificant for subsamples if it takes linear form in above 
models and other explanatory items do not show difference on significance and sign. 
This is the “worst” value of fair population share regarding to growth.  
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